heeck schreef: ↑15 feb 2019 14:55
Maarten,
Kastrup heeft het meestal over de zijns insziens onverenigbaarheid van het ervaren van iets en wat daarvan of daarmee neurologisch is vastgelegd; het zg "Hard problem" van Chalmers.
Jij lijkt met dit aanhalen te impliceren dat nooit zal worden uitgevlooid hoe onze hersenen ons practisch continu verassen met een ervaringsgevoel en dat er andere onvindbare verklaringsmodellen zouden moeten worden aangehaald.
Roeland
Roeland, Maarten... wat vinden jullie hiervan?
Een ander verklaringsmodel.
Deze combineert science (hard problem) met experience (phenomenon): Riccardo Manzotti:
The Spread Mind
What are we? A soul? An immaterial mind? A flow of energy? Are we our bodies or neural patterns in our brains? There is an answer to such questions that is compatible both with hard science and with our own insights into conscious experience. But it is not the one currently defended by influential neuroscientists like Christof Koch or internalist philosophers like David Chalmers.1 The answer is a theory of consciousness I call the Spread Mind2 that overturns the currently accepted conceptual landscape in three straightforward steps. But first let us outline the common ground it shares with neuroscience.
The Spread Mind goes back to the roots of science and takes a different path forward. The world is not a collection of objective properties appearing to us through a veil of subjective appearances. The world is one, and it is all made of the same stuff. What is this stuff? The basic idea is that all physical properties are relative — size, velocity, shape, color, weight, and so on. They are all relative to other physical objects. Crucially, they are not subjective, which would entail that they are relative to a subject, but relative instead to other objects. Thus, there is no need to consider subjective-objective dichotomies. Each physical entity is what it is relative to another physical entity. In this manner the physical world maintains it immanent status and yet the physical world is much richer than Galileo had at first supposed.
...
Abandon the idea that we are separate from reality. Give up the perhaps flattering but odd and untenable notion that we are subjects amidst objects. We are not different from the world; we are objects too; we are no metaphysical exception. The traditional boundary between internal and external does not mark the separation between us, our experience, and the world. It marks more humbly the separation between our bodies — sense doors, nerve pathways, brain activities — and the surrounding environment. But we are neither our bodies nor are we inside them. We are the world that exists relative to our bodies. Our consciousness is such a world. Our mind is spread to be a world.
P.S.
Riccardo Manzotti teaches Psychology of Perception at IULM University, Milan, Italy, and has been a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at MIT. He has specialized in AI, artificial vision, perception and the issue of consciousness. After working in the field of artificial vision, he focused his research on the nature of phenomenal experience, how it emerges from physical processes and how it is related to objects perceived.