De Gulden Regel is ouder dan om het even welke beschaving, in feite zelfs ouder dan de mensheid.
De Gulden Regel duikt op in de evolutionaire biologie bij Frans de Waal en Martin Nowak.
In «Van Nature Goed» (2005; 1996) schrijft De Waal in “De minder dan gulden regel” – ik citeer volledig:
Het begrip ruilen staat centraal in de theorie van wederkerig altruïsme die in het begin van de jaren zeventig door Robert Trivers is ontwikkeld. Hoewel er grote verschillen zijn met de theorie die een paar jaar eerder door William Hamilton werd geïntroduceerd, zijn deze theorieën in geen geval met elkaar in tegenspraak; ze vullen elkaar juist keurig aan. Hamilton’s theorie verklaart waarom dieren vaak hun naaste verwanten helpen. Zelfs als een dergelijk altruïsme voor de voortplantingskansen van de uitvoerders nadelig zou zijn, wil dat niet zeggen dat de betreffende genen niet bij de volgende generatie terecht kunnen komen. Per definitie lijken familieleden genetisch op de uitvoerder, en soms zijn ze zelfs identiek. Ze zullen daarom de ontvangen hulp goed benutten door het verspreiden van die genen. Vanuit een genetisch standpunt is hulp aan familie gelijk aan zelfhulp.
In eerste instantie werd wederkerig altruïsme is discussies over de oorsprong van altruïsme en wederzijdse hulp volledig overschaduwd door verwantenselectie. De aandacht was in die tijd sterk gericht op sociale insekten (die vaak in kolonies van naaste verwanten leven), en er waren veel te weinig ondersteunende argumenten voor de theorie van Trivers. De laatste jaren begint wederkerig altruïsme weer de aandacht te krijgen die het verdient, met name in het onderzoek bij primaten en andere zoogdieren. Dit is ten dele te danken aan de huidige fascinatie voor cognitieve capaciteiten; wederkerig altruïsme is namelijk een ingewikkeld mechanisme dat is gebaseerd op het zich herinneren van verleende en ontvangen gunsten. Vanuit een moreel standpunt is nog belangrijker dat bij wederkerig altruïsme coöperatieve netwerken zich kunnen uitbreiden tot buiten de familiebanden.
Niet dat steun aan familie moreel gezien zonder betekenis zou zijn – in elk moreel stelsel leggen familieverplichtingen groot gewicht in de schaal – maar de neiging daartoe is in en van zichzelf al heel krachtig. Het kan soms zelfs leiden tot duidelijk oneerlijke situaties, bijvoorbeeld wanneer iemand in een machtspositie overheidsbanen gaat uitdelen aan familieleden. In onze maatschappij wordt weliswaar het bevoordelen van familie vanzelfsprekend gevonden, maar toch maakt men zich er wel degelijk zorgen over.
We bewaren onze sterkste morele goedkeuring voor de meer kwetsbare neigingen die ten grondslag liggen aan het algemene welzijn, zoals delen en samenwerken buiten de familie- of vriendenkring. De doeltreffendste manier om deze neigingen in te prenten is door een of andere koppeling tot stand te brengen tussen geven en nemen. Het gebruikelijke argument is dat we beter af zijn als we elkaar helpen, en dat de baten van zo’n systeem veel groter zijn dan de energie die je erin moet stoppen. Dit vooruitlopen op winst is belangrijk in het morele contract tussen mensen – uiteraard niet in elke uitwisseling, maar gemiddeld genomen. Daarom is het niet mogelijk zo’n contract te verbreken zonder ernstige consequenties, zoals verbanning, opsluiting of executie. Alle gezonde mannen en vrouwen zijn erbij betrokken. Waarom zou je je inspannen voor een gemeenschap waarin anderen werkloos aan de kant staan?
Wederkerigheid kan best bestaan zonder moraliteit; maar moraliteit zonder wederkerigheid is onmogelijk. Als we deze stelling aanvaarden, zal het duidelijk zijn waarom de allereerste stap in de richting van de gulden regel werd gezet door schepsels die gingen leven volgens de wederkerigheidsregel: “Doe zoals de ander doet, en verwacht van de ander dat hij doet zoals jij deed”. (De Waal’s voetnoot hierbij: “Deze regel kan niet verklaren hoe altruïstische uitwisselingen zijn begonnen. Een eenvoudige reactieneiging (‘Doe wat de ander doet’) voldoet niet. Uit computersimulaties van ‘voor wat hoort wat’-strategieën blijkt dat een coöperatieve beginhouding noodzakelijk is (Axelrod en Hamilton, The evolution of cooperation, 1981)”)
Al is dit een regelrechte ‘voor wat hoort wat’-formulering – terwijl wederkerig altruïsme heel wat flexibeler en variabeler is – toch zijn de eerste aanwijzingen voor morele schuld en verplichting al herkenbaar”
F.De Waal, Van Nature Goed, 2005 (1996), hfst 4 "Quid Pro Quo", "De minder dan gulden regel", pp. 159-160)
Wie kan dit topic (en indirect mij) helpen aan eventuele citaten over de gulden regel uit De Waal’s «De Aap en de Filosoof»? (staat op mn boeken-verlanglijstje)
Novak brengt de gulden regel in «SuperCooperators» twee keer naar voren.
Eerst in “Brainpower and Indirect Reciprocity” uit het tweede hoofdstuk (volledig citaat):
Indirect reciprocity is not only a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation but also provides the impetus for the evolution of a big brain. To explain why, I should again emphasize that cooperation means paying a cost for someone to receive a benefit. Thus, in effect, we buy a reputation. For example, it costs you precious time when you come to the aid of a stranger so that you may end up being late for that pressing appointment with your boss. Or if you give a lift to someone whose automobile has broken down, you could end up with a smear of motor oil on your new silk tie. But the point is that this little generous act secures you a reputation, which might be worth a great deal – more than the initial cost – in the long run.
Thanks to the power of reputation, we help others without expecting an immediate return. If, thanks to endless chat and intrigue, the world knows that you are a good, charitable guy, than you boost your chance of being helped by someone else at some future date. The converse is also the case. I am less likely to get my back scratched, in the form of a favour, if it becomes known that I never scratch anybody else’s. Indirect reciprocity now means something like “If I scratch your back, my good example will encourage others to do the same and, with luck, someone will scratch mine”.
By the same token, our behaviour is endlessly molded by the possibility that somebody else might be watching us or might find out what we have done. We are often troubled by the thought of what others may think of our deeds. In this way, our actions have consequences that go far beyond any individual act of charity, or indeed any act of mean-spirited malice. Our behaviour is affected by the possibility that somebody else might be watching us. We all behave differently when we know we live in the shadow of the future.
That shadow is cast by our actions because there is always the possibility that others will find out what we have done, whatever the society: it could be the man from the local village gazing down on you from a hill when you helped an old lady; or the woman who was walking by when you carried all those groceries for your wife; or the boy who came to deliver a gift to a neighbour; or the guy who sits at the adjoining desk; or the security guard looking at you through a closed-circuit camera. Each of us also wants our friends, family, parents, and loved ones to know that we are good, helpful people. In coming to the aid of another, or letting a person down, you not only help develop your reputation; you also help perpetuate and bolster the complex and tangled web of indirect reciprocity essential for a large, complex society to run smoothly.
For many people to appreciate your selfless act, and for your reputation to flourish, we need more than language. We need smart and receptive brains. Indirect reciprocity relies on what others think of us. Making a reputation has been shown to engage much of the same reward circuitry in the brain as making money. By being helpful, I obtain the reputation of being a nice, obliging, and considerate person. My behaviour toward you, of course, now depends on your reputation and thus what you have done to others: if you have been a cad and a rotter, I am less likely to trust you to deliver. Then again, if we know nothing about someone, we are often willing to give them the benefit of the doubt for the sake of our own reputation.
There is a clear link between this mechanism of cooperation and the evolution of empathy. We need to have a good idea of what is going through the mind of another person in order to understand and appreciate the motivation of a Good Samaritan. “Even though he was rushing home to see his ill mother, he stopped to help that injured man”, “If I had been lying there, bleeding at the curbside, I would have been so grateful for the help of a stranger”, “I could see she was in pain and felt I had to help”, and so on. We require, in the parlance of the psychologists, a ‘theory of mind’, that remarkable capacity that enables us to understand the desires, motivations, and intentions of others. This mind-reading ability allows us to infer another’s perspective – whether emotional or intellectual.
One can easily envisage how the mechanism of indirect reciprocity can stimulate the evolution of moral systems. The quotation of Luke at the start of this chapter has a direct corollary, known as the Golden Rule, that transcends all cultures and religions: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”. The rule pops up in Greek philosophy (“What you wish your neighbors to be to you, you will also be to them”, Sextus the Pythagorean), Buddhism (“Putting oneself in the place of another, one should not kill nor cause another to kill”), Christianity and Judaism (“Love your neighbour as yourself”), in the Mahabharata of Hinduism (“One should never do that to another which one regards as injurious to one’s own self”, in the Farewell Sermon of Mohammed (“Hurt no one so that no one may hurt you”) and in Taoism too (“He is kind to the kind; he is also kind to the unkind”).
The Golden Rule interlinks several ideas: it binds empathy with the idea of reciprocity along with an ironclad faith in the power of indirect reciprocity – if I am good to another person today, someone will be good to me in the future. In this way, indirect reciprocity has played a central role in the development of our brains, of our ability to lay down memories, and of our language and moral codes. This remarkably potent ingredient of cooperation is at the heart of what it means to be human
Novak, SuperCooperators, hfdst 2, “Brainpower and Indirect Reciprocity”, pp. 54-56
De gulden regel komt in Novak’s boek een tweede keer naar voren in het (boven nog ongeciteerde) restant van “Mechanics of Cooperation”:
…
If cooperation thrives due to the mechanism of multilevel selection, for example, then although there might always be an incensive to defect, those groups who have a higher percentage of people willing to sacrifice themselves for the greater good can do better. A nation, cult or a religion can be seen as a group that is bound by the way that an individual makes sacrifices to help his brethren.
In direct or indirect reciprocity, we can glimpse the traditional idea that “one good turn deserves another”. What I find amazing is that these calculations show that despite nature’s competitive setting – based on natural selection – the winning strategies of direct and indirect reciprocity must have the following “charitable” attributes: be hopeful, generous, and forgiving. Hopeful here means that if I meet a newcomer then I hope that I can establish the basis of cooperation with him by making an effort to cooperate. Forgiving means that if someone defects, than I will work hard to re-establish a relationship based on cooperation. Generous means that in most of my interactions with other people, I do not adopt a myopic perspective. I do not moan about who is doing better than me and who is getting the bigger share of the pie. Instead, I am content with equal or even slightly smaller shares but enjoy many productive and helpful interactions overall; now many more pies get shared.
In this way, my work on cooperation highlights which kinds of behaviour are important for human evolution and success in daily life. We have five mechanisms that can work separately and together to help everone to get along. What is remarkable is that from an analytical, quantative, and mathematical basis I can come up with ideas that should seem as familiar to secular ethicists as they are to followers of religions.
Diverse faiths are united by the reciprocity of the Golden Rule, as we saw in chapter 2. Evolution, which as first glance seems to present problems for faith, actually hones selfless, altruistic, and perhaps even saintly behaviour. The teachings of the great world religions have much in common in that they provide ancient recipes for how to lead a fulfilled life. For millennia they have analyzed the human condition to ameliorate suffering and sadness. They have come to the conclusion that love, hope, and forgiveness are essential components of what is needed to solve the biggest problems. They call for unselfish action. Jesus says if you give, then your left hand should not know what your right hand is doing. Krishna says to the prince Arjuna in the Bhagavad Gita: you have to see yourself in every creature. You have to experience the sufferings of others as your own. For those who follow a faith, the solution comes when the drive to be selfish is overwhelmed by love. In the language we have encountered in this book, the teachings of the world religions can be seen as recipes for cooperation. Now, for the first time, aspects of these powerful ideas have been quantified in experiments, captured in equations, and enshrined in science.
Novak, SuperCooperators, hfdst. 14 “Cresendo of Cooperation”, “Mechanics of Cooperation”, pp. 272-273
Alle mensen worden vrij en gelijk in waardigheid en rechten geboren. Zij zijn begiftigd met verstand en geweten, en behoren zich jegens elkander in een geest van broederschap te gedragen. Art.1 vd Universele Verklaring vd Rechten vd Mens