Interessant dat het onderzoek gebruik maakt van game-theory.
En dat de kern om coöperatie gaat. .."
natural selection inventing evolutionarily novel solutions—“tools and rules”—for further bolstering cooperation"
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/f ... 086/701478
More recently, improvisational intelligence and cultural transmission (Boyd, Richerson, and Henrich 2011; Pinker 2010) have made it possible for humans to attempt to improve upon natural selection’s solutions by inventing evolutionarily novel solutions—“tools and rules”—for further bolstering cooperation (Binmore 1994a, 1994b; Hammerstein 2003; Nagel 1991; Popper 1945). Together, these biological and cultural mechanisms provide the motivation for social, cooperative, and altruistic behavior—leading individuals to value and pursue specific mutually beneficial outcomes. They also provide the criteria by which individuals recognize, evaluate, and police the cooperative behavior of others. And, according to the theory of morality-as-cooperation, it is precisely these multiple solutions to problems of cooperation—this collection of instincts, intuitions, inventions, and institutions—that constitute human morality (Curry 2005, 2016).
And we show how each type of cooperation explains a corresponding type of morality:
(1) family values,
(2) group loyalty,
(3) reciprocity,
(4) bravery,
(5) respect,
(6) fairness,
(7) property rights.
Thus morality-as-cooperation uses the theory of non-zero-sum games to identify distinct problems of cooperation and their solutions, and thereby generates a deductive framework in which to make sense of morality.
Allocation of Resources to Kin (Family Values)
Genes that benefit replicas of themselves in other individuals—that is, genetic relatives—will be favored by natural selection if the cost of helping is outweighed by the benefit to the recipient gene(s)
Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—caring for offspring, helping family members, and avoiding inbreeding—will be regarded as morally good.
1)
Allocation of Resources to Kin (Family Values)
Genes that benefit replicas of themselves in other individuals—that is, genetic relatives—will be favored by natural selection if the cost of helping is outweighed by the benefit to the recipient gene(s) So, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that under some conditions organisms will possess adaptations for detecting and delivering benefits (or avoiding doing harm) to kin. This theory of kin selection explains many instances of altruism, in many species
Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—caring for offspring, helping family members, and avoiding inbreeding—will be regarded as morally good.
2)
Coordination to Mutual Advantage (Group Loyalty)
Game theory models situations in which individuals are uncertain about how to behave to bring about a mutual benefit as coordination problems. Humans and other animals use a variety of strategies—such as focal points, traditions, leadership, signaling, badges of membership, and “theory of mind”—to solve these problems and form stable coalitions and alliances Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—forming friendships, participating in collaborative endeavors, favoring your own group, and adopting local conventions—will be regarded as morally good.
3)
Social Exchange (Reciprocity)
In game theory, social dilemmas—prisoners’ dilemmas, public goods games, tragedies of the commons—arise when the fruits of cooperation are vulnerable to exploitation by “free riders,” who accept the benefit of cooperation without paying the cost . This problem can be overcome by a strategy of “conditional cooperation” or “reciprocal altruism,” such as tit-for-tat. Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—trusting others, reciprocating favors, seeking revenge, expressing gratitude, and making amends—will be regarded as morally good.
4 & 5)
Contests between Hawks (Bravery) and Doves (Respect)
Conflict over resources—food, territory, and mates presents organisms with an opportunity to cooperate by competing in less mutually destructive ways. There are three ways of achieving this: contests (featuring the display of hawkish and dovish traits), division, and possession.
Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that these types of cooperative behavior—hawkish displays of dominance (the “heroic virtues” of bravery, fortitude, skill, and wit) and dovish displays of submission (the “monkish virtues” of humility, deference, obedience, and respect)—will be regarded as morally good.
6)
Division (Fairness)
When the contested resource is divisible, game theory models the situation as a “bargaining problem”. Here, one solution is to divide the resource in proportion to the relative (bargaining) power of the protagonists. In the case of equally powerful individuals, this results in equal shares.
Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—dividing disputed resources, reaching a compromise, being fair—will be regarded as morally good.
7)
Possession (Property Rights)
Finally, game theory shows that conflicts over resources can be resolved by recognition of prior possession Private property, in some form or other, appears to be a cross-cultural universal (Herskovits 1952).
Morality-as-cooperation leads us to expect that this type of cooperative behavior—deferring to prior possession—will be regarded as morally good.
Conclusion
We have shown how morality-as-cooperation, through the use of game theory, exhibits a theoretical precision and explanatory scope that supersedes that of previous cooperative accounts of morality. And we have shown how one of the theory’s central predictions—that cooperation is always and everywhere considered moral—is supported by an extensive cross-cultural survey of moral values. As such, we have removed two major obstacles to the theory’s wider adoption. Thus, we recommend morality-as-cooperation to the field, and encourage fellow anthropologists to join us in testing its many further implications.
